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KEENE CORPORATION, 
a corpora ti on, 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
R. W. TAYLOR STEEL 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
RALPH W. TAYLOR and 
LOU JEAN M. TAYLOR, 
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Appellants. 
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SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
Case No. 15787 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
KEENE CORPORATION IN OPPOSITION 
TO DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS' 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
By unanimous opinion filed April 13, 1979, this Court 
held and determined that the Defendants could not assert the 
defense that Keene had violated the federal antitrust laws to a 
claim by Keene for the agreed price of goods sold, accepted, and 
delivered and, therefore, that Defendants were not entitled to a 
stay of this action pending the outcome of a lengthy and protracted 
antitrust action pendinp: in Federal Court. 
-1-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
A surrrrnary of the proceedings in the District Court of 
Weber County is set forth in the Brief of Plaintiff-Resoondent 
Keene Corporation herein and the Court is resoectfully referred 
thereto. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
Keene seeks the denial of Defendants' Petition for 
Rehearing so as finally to terminate Defendants' nonpayment of 
the long overdue and admitted debt which is the subject of this 
action. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS WITH 
CITATIONS TO THE RECORD 
A SUimllary of each fact Keene believes relevant to 
the disposition of this action, together with full and complete 
citations to the record appears in the Brief of Keene Corporation 
herein and the Court is respectfully referred thereto. 
ARGUMENT 
1. 
THE DISTRICT COURT AND THIS COURT WERE JURISDICTIONALLY 
EMPOWERED TO PREVENT THE ASSERTION BY DEFENDANTS OF A 
DEFENSE IN THIS ACTION THAT KEENE VIOLATED THE FEDERAL 
ANTITRUST LAWS AND DEFENDANTS WILL LOSE NO DEFENSE, 
VALID OR INVALID, IN BEING REQUIRED TO PAY THE AGREED 
PRICE OF GOODS SOLD, ACCEPTED, AND DELIVERED BEFORE 
THE RESOLUTION OF AN ANTITRUST ACTION PENDING IN 
FEDERAL COURT. 
Defendants, in their Brief in Support of Petition for Re· 
hearing (page 6), accuse this Court of being "Procrustean" and 
corrrrnitting "technical subterfuge" in its Opinion of April 13, 1979· 
-2-
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Defendants continue by resurrecting the same arguments they pre-
sented to this Court in their opening Brief, Reply Brief, and 
oral argument in the apparent hope that they can make those argu-
ments persuasive by repetition alone. Since Defendants have pre-
sented nothing new, the purpose of their Petition for Rehearing 
only can be further to delay the payment of their long overdue 
and admitted debt. Keene respectfully submits that the Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the District Court and this 
Court's Opinion of April 13, 1979, obviously are correct, and 
Defendants' Petition for Rehearing should be denied. 
Insofar as Keene is able to un<lerstand Defendants' argu-
ments in their Brief in Support of Its Petition for Rehearing, they 
can be surmnarized as follows: 
1) This Court's determination in its April 13, 
1979 Opinion that no basis existed in the record in this action 
to find that Grating, Inc. 's contracts of purchase and sale with 
Keene fell within the narrow ambit of circumstances where the 
antitrust defense has been permitted, in effect enforced federal 
antitrust law, which this Court has no power to do under Section 
lS of the Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C.A., Section 15. 
2) Since this Court merely should have dismissed 
the antitrust defense without prejudice, it also should have 
stayed the enforcement of the judgment in this action until the 
resolution of the federal antitrust action. 
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It is clear from Defendants' Brief in Support of the 
Petition for Rehearing that Defendants' entire argument fails if 
this Court is empowered to make the decisions it did in this case. 
In its Opinion in this case, this Court did not purport to enforce 
the federal antitrust laws. What it did determine was that on the 
basis of the evidence disclosed by the record there was no basis 
"to compel a finding that Grating's contracts of purchase from 
Keene were inherently illegal, nor that enforcing collection of 
the stated purchase price for the steel products would be invoking 
the powers of the Court to aid an unlawful activity." (Opinion, 
p.2.) In this decision, the Court was neither enforcing nor con· 
struing the antitrust laws. Rather, it was following principles 
eni.-t.11c..,'a...fe p d 
of law as eft1:H11erato~ by the federal courts, including the Unite 
States Supreme Court, as well as by the overwhelming majority of 
other state courts that have considered the same problem. (See 
cases cited at footnote 6, page 2, of this Court's Opinion,) 
As pointed out in Keene's Brief, most state courts when 
faced with an antitrust defense, have proceeded to determine 
whether the facts as alleged would fall within the narrow situatior 
where such a defense has been permitted based on the federal 
statutef, as that statute and its application have been constru~ 
by the United States Supreme Court. To follow and apply to 
particular allegations or evidence principles of law as laid down 
by the United States Supreme Court, is not only within the 
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jurisdiction of this Court, but also is an important part of 
its duty. Such procedure by a state court does not involve 
construction nor enforcement of the federal antitrust laws. 
Defendants' argument to the contrary would lead to an 
absurd result. Whenever confronted with a defense based on the 
federal antitrust statute in a simple action for breach of 
contract, the state court must roll over and play dead, since, 
, according to the defendants, it would have no jurisdiction to 
proceed but would have to wait upon some future and indefinite 
adjudication in a federal court. 
Indeed, Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co.', 
330 U.S. 743, 67 S.Ct. 1015, 91 L.Ed. 1219 (1947), one of the 
United States Supreme Court cases relied upon by this Court in 
its Opinion herein, was an appeal from the Florida State Supreme 
Court. In that case, the Supreme Court affirmed the holding of 
the Florida Supreme Court that under the facts alleged an anti-
trust defense could not be asserted to a claim for the agreed 
price of goods sold and delivered because violations of the 
Sherman Act did not inhere in the particular contract there in 
suit. 330 U.S. at 755. Moreover, in each case, except the first, 
1 
cited by thie Court in Footnote 6 on page two of its Opinion, a 
~reached the same result. 
In its Opinion this Court performed exactly the same 
I 
analysis as other state courts have done when presented with a 
-5-
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similar situation. This Court correctly determined that the record 
herein did not support a finding that the purchase orders and in· 
voices which were the subject of this action reflecting a contract 
for the agreed price of goods sold and delivered were inherently 
illegal or involved the precise conduct made illegal by the Sherm~ 
Act, as that Act had been construed by the federal courts. That 
should be the end of the matter. 
Defendants in this action need no stay to see what 
another court may or may not do in the future, since this Court 
clearly had the power to hold as it did in its Opinion in this 
case. However, even assuming the contrary and, further, assuming 
that Grating, Inc. is successful in its antitrust defense to Keene'1 
Counterclaim in the federal court action, defendants' request for 
a stay of this action still would make no sense. That would mean 
that Grating, Inc. also would have been successful as Plaintiff 
with regard to its antitrust claims against Keene because the 
antitrust defense by Grating, Inc. and its antitrust claim against 
Keene are the same. Thus, Grating, Inc. would have received a 
judgment against Keene for three times the damage to Grating, 
Inc.'s business or property. How Defendants hers could be 
prejudiced by that result is impossible to understand. That 
judgment would have absolutely no effect on the judgment entered 
in this action. That judgment would not somehow magically render 
the judgment in this action void, as asserted by Defendants. 
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Obviously, Keene cannot collect the judgment in this 
action against trade account guarantors and also collect the same 
debt against Grating, Inc. , the primary obligor, in another action, 
and Keene has no intention of attempting to do so. It is, o;f 
course, the purest fiction and a sham attempt by Defendants to 
elevate form over substance for them to attempt to distinguish 
Grating, Inc., R. W. Taylor Steel Co., and Ralph W. Taylor from 
one another. R. W. Taylor is the president and sole shareholder 
of both R. W. Taylor Steel Co. and Grating, Inc. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted 
that Defendants' Petition for Rehearing should be denied, 
DATED this 31st day of May, 1979. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & 
McCARTHY 
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